Orders of intentionality
What this term means (as used in the literature)
Orders of intentionality are a way to describe the recursive embedding of mental states in a representation (e.g., “I think that you believe that…”), where the order is the number of distinct embedded mind-states in the chain. (Dennett, 1983, DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X00016393; Lewis et al., 2017, DOI: 10.1093/scan/nsx034)
This idea is often discussed under mentalising / mindreading / theory of mind (ToM) as recursive understanding of mental states. (Lewis et al., 2017, DOI: 10.1093/scan/nsx034)
Related terms (established usage)
- Mentalising / mindreading / Theory of Mind (ToM): Ability to infer others’ mental states and recognize that mental states can affect behavior. (Premack & Woodruff, 1978, DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X00076512; Lewis et al., 2017, DOI: 10.1093/scan/nsx034)
- Formal Theory of Mind (false-belief competence): In at least one established framing, “formal” ToM is discussed as recognizing false belief and is equated with second-order intentionality (“I believe that you think … even when I know it isn’t true”). (Lewis et al., 2017, DOI: 10.1093/scan/nsx034)
- Second-order false belief: A classic developmental formulation of second-order belief understanding appears in the literature on second-order false-belief reasoning. (Perner & Wimmer, 1985, DOI: 10.1016/0022-0965(85)90051-7)
Why this reference page exists (scope)
This page defines orders of intentionality as a terminology anchor for the repository, so that when other pages discuss “first/second/higher-order” mental-state reasoning, they can link here instead of redefining the concept. (Dennett, 1983, DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X00016393; Lewis et al., 2017, DOI: 10.1093/scan/nsx034)
References (primary / peer-reviewed)
- Dennett, D. C. (1983). Intentional systems in cognitive ethology: The “Panglossian paradigm” defended. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X00016393
- Premack, D., & Woodruff, G. (1978). Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? Behavioral and Brain Sciences. DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X00076512
- Lewis, P. A., Birch, A., Hall, A., & Dunbar, R. I. M. (2017). Higher order intentionality tasks are cognitively more demanding. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience. DOI: 10.1093/scan/nsx034
- Perner, J., & Wimmer, H. (1985). “John thinks that Mary thinks…” Attribution of second-order beliefs by 5- to 10-year-old children. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology. DOI: 10.1016/0022-0965(85)90051-7